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INCOMMENSURABILITY: TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?
BRIAN LEITERt
Frederick Schauer wants to bypass the question of whether the
"incommensurability thesis" is true.1 His question is whether it would
be good to believe the thesis along some nonepistemic dimension
(such as whether it is utility-maximizing). Eric Posner thinks we can
explain why people affirm belief in incommensurability, quite apart
2
from the truth of the thesis. In this sense, both of their articles
might just as well have appeared in a symposium on "Norms for Be-
lief' or "Explanations for Normativity," as in one on " Law and In-
commensurability." The claims that human beings possess free will,
thatjudges are bound to decide according to law and have little or no
room for the exercise of discretion, or that creationism is as much
"science" as evolution, are all claims that might be addressed in the
spirit of Posner and Schauer. We might, of course, ask, "Are these
claims true?"-the standard philosophical question-or we could ask,
A la Posner and Schauer, "Is it or would it be useful or advantageous to
believe these claims?" What we might call the "truth-norm"-the
norm that we should only believe what is true-is ordinarily the
dominant norm in academic discourse. Even indirect utilitarians like
John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick accept, at bottom, the truth-
norm: It is only because utilitarianism is truly the correct normative
theory that, as a merely instrumental matter, they think it best if most
people conducted their affairs by reference to nonutilitarian norms.
By contrast, Schauer thinks that we can, or should, dispense with the
truth-norm in thinking about incommensurability, and Posner thinks
that we can explain belief in incommensurability without regard to its
truth.
t Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor in Law and Professor of Philosophy, The
University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to Matt Adler for his invitation to contrib-
ute to this Symposium.
' See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215
(1998).
2 See Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior. A Critique of the Incom-
mensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185 (1998).
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I. SCHAUER, SEMANTICS, AND TRUTH
Let us call "Epistemic Agnosticism" the view that norms for belief
need not make reference to the truth-bearing features of proposi-
tions. Thus, we might say that one ought to believe certain proposi-
tions simply because doing so maximizes good consequences or
because doing so satisfies a nonconsequential demand of reason. Let
us call "Fictionalism" the view that one ought to believe certain false
propositions because doing so maximizes good consequences or
because doing so satisfies a nonconsequential demand of reason.
Fictionalism is just a subset of Epistemic Agnosticism, though one
that highlights the radical character of the position: For by this line
of reasoning, even the falsity of a proposition is not an obstacle to the
justification of belief.
I do not mean to impugn Fictionalism because of its radicalism. I
am Nietzschean enough to recognize both that truth is a genuine
property of propositions and that the value of believing true proposi-
3tions is an entirely different question. I do think, however, that once
we enter this realm of debate, we leave entirely behind philosophical
questions distinctive of incommensurability, and we enter the realm of
4epistemology and speculative empirical social science.
Schauer's article is clearer than Posner's about its irrelevance to
the truth of the incommensurability thesis, and this is a virtue.
Schauer speaks, even in the title, of "Instrumental Commensurabil-
ity," and he is at pains to emphasize that "there is a nonnormative fact
of the matter" about whether or not values are incommensurable.5
His fundamental point, however, is one about epistemology (what we
ought to believe), not semantics (what words mean), and he only
confuses issues, I think, by bringing on board certain baggage from
the philosophy of language.
There is, first of all, a certain muddying of the philosophical wa-
ters in suggesting that Charles Stevenson's notion that certain predi-
3 On Nietzsche's views in this regard, see BRIAN LEITER, NIETzsCHE ON MORALIY
(forthcoming 2000), and Brian Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals,
in NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY, MORALITY 334, 351 (Richard Schacht ed., 1994) (rejecting
the "Received View" of Nietzsche's perspectivism and arguing that Nietzche's perspec-
tivism still permits "modest objectivity" in answering our "mundane questions about
truth and knowledge").
4 I do not, of course, think that the realm of empirical social science is outside the
realm of philosophy. See Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Juriprudence in
ANALYZING LAw: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY (Brian Bix ed., forthcoming 1998).
5 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1223.
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cates have "emotive meaning"6 and Philippa Foot's notion that certain
predicates are "thick concepts"7 (involving an inextricable bonding of
the descriptive and evaluative)8 show "that one need not reject the
fact-value distinction nor subscribe to the central tenets of continental
philosophy in order to recognize that descriptive sentences contain-
ing seemingly descriptive words arrayed in a seemingly descriptive
semantic structure often mask statements and conclusions that are in
important ways normative, evaluative, and prescriptive."
9 It is cer-
tainly correct to observe that a central theme of twentieth-century
philosophy has been that syntax, or grammatical form, is a poor guide
to semantics, or meaning. And it is also surely correct that semantics
can be parsed from one's metaphysics of facts and values. But it is
misleading to embed this point in a discussion of Stevenson and Foot.
For Foot does reject the fact-value distinction, and what is more, she
thinks her point about the semantics of "thick" concepts undergirds
that rejection.' Similarly, Stevenson thinks (like R.M. Hare" after
him) that the fact that one can parse, at the level of meaning, the
descriptive from the evaluative shows precisely that the fact-value
distinction is a viable one after all.'
2 Schauer cautions that there are
"important differences" between these claims,'
3 but "important"
6 Id. at 1220 (citing CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 33 (1944)).
7 See id. at 1220-21 (citing PHILIPPA FOOT, Moral Arguments, in VIRTUES AND VICES
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96 (1978)).
8 I leave aside H.L.A. Hart's "ascriptive language," see id. at 1221-22 (citing H.L.A.
Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOc'Y (n.s.) 171
(1949)), which strikes me as simply a case of"thick concepts," the thickness of which is
attributable to their institutional setting within the law. Even a Stevensonian emotivist
could acknowledge that predicates, when embedded in certain institutional practices and
their attendant nons, inextricably link descriptive and normative claims. Indeed, it is
lack of attention to this latter point that seems to me to vitiate the argument in Heidi
Li Feldman, Objectivity in LegalJudgment 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1190 (1994) (arguing
that concepts like "negligence" and "fraud" are thick or "blend" concepts, because
they "blend description and evaluation").
" Schauer, supra note 1, at 1222. Despite having taught a doctoral seminar this
year on "The Continental Tradition," I confess to having no idea what "the central
tenets of continental philosophy" are; indeed, I doubt there are any such things. I
assume what Schauer has in mind are certain contemporary themes associated with
postmodernist and deconstructionist writers about language. But these themes are
absent from most of the major figures in the Continental tradition, like Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Husserl.
'0 See FOOT, supra note 7; PHILIPPA FOOT, Moral Beliefs, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 110.
" SeeR.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952).
12 See STEVENSON, supra note 6; CHARLES L. STEVENSON, FACTS AND VALUES (1963).
"' Schauer, supra note 1, at 1222.
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seems to me an understatement: They are just different claims, re-
flecting opposing views of the semantics, purpose, and potentialities
of moral discourse.
4
More significantly, Schauer himself has reasons to want to stay
away from the semantics of "commensurability talk," since he has
already committed himself to a cognitivist interpretation: He has told
us, as noted above, that claims about commensurability are either
true or false. So let us leave semantics out of it. The issue is what we
should believe, not what words mean. Schauer himself suggests as
much when he writes that "[t] he question is no longer only which of
[commensurability or incommensurability] is true, but also which of
these alternatives, if widely accepted, or if accepted by a certain cadre
of public decisionmakers, would produce the best consequences, or
the morally best world."' But here we have moved from semantics to
epistemic states-for example, "acceptance"-and are discussing the
norms governing these states, not the semantic content of symbols.
I have nothing to add to Schauer's interesting speculations about
the consequences of believing or disbelieving in commensurability. I
do note that some of Schauer's scenarios explicitly involve Fictional-
ism, as when he writes that "[e]ven if there are incommensur-
ables,. . . it might be best to assume that there are not."' 6 I would,
however, suggest that there is one further complicating factor absent
from Schauer's calculations. As long as we are in a consequentialist
mode of reasoning about norms for belief, we also ought to factor in
the consequences of abandoning the truth-norm in deciding what to
believe about commensurability, or any other topic for that matter.
Lack of commitment to the truth-norm must also surely have conse-
quences, some no doubt pernicious. To talk in isolation about non-
truth-based reasons for accepting incommensurability (or its oppo-
site) is to bracket from the consequential calculation what may be the
most serious consideration: namely, the consequences of deciding
what to believe without regard to its truth.
II. POSNER, SPECULATION, AND STRATEGIES
Posner's article is not, contrary to its title, "a critique of the in-
commensurability thesis," where this thesis is understood (as it is by
14 Foot, after all, introduced the idea of "thick" concepts in the course of critiqu-
ing the noncognitivism of Hare and Stevenson. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
'- Schauer, supra note 1, at 1225.
'6 Id. at 1227.
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all its philosophical proponents) as a thesis about the truth of incom-
mensurability. Posner thinks otherwise only because of his mistaken
supposition that the truth of the thesis turns on its explanatory fit
with actual human behavior. This focus, in turn, is motivated by
Posner's perception that, construed as a theory of behavior, the in-
commensurability thesis threatens the explanatory imperialism of
rational choice theory. I confess to a failure of intellectual empathy at
this point, since the empirical inadequacy of rational choice theory
strikes me as yesterday's news. But my ambition in this modest
comment on Posner's stimulating article is not to dethrone econom-
ics,"' but rather to examine the adequacy of his "strategic" approach
to the incommensurability debate.
Posner claims that the incommensurability thesis "is a label at-
tached to a social phenomenon: the tendency of many people to
refuse to make tradeoffs in everyday life that are said to be demanded
by the theory of rational choice."' 9 Let us assume-plausibly enough
given the authors Posner cites2°---that this claim is not intended as a
stipulative definition of the thesis. In that case, however, it is a mis-
statement of the thesis, for none of the philosophical writers on
incommensurability takes the thesis to depend on its viability as a
hypothesis in explanatory social science. Like most philosophical
theses, the thesis that values are incommensurable appeals to our
ordinary ways of thinking and talking about values, but not necessarily
to our actual behavior. Of course, our concept of values may manifest
itself in our behavior-as well as in our ideas and in our talk-but
behavior is, in almost all cases, only defeasible (often easily defeasi-
ble) evidence as to the concept.2 The reasons why this should be so
are suggested by Posner's own putative "counter-examples":
17 Empirical psychologists, for example, have established the existence of "prefer-
ence reversal," thus undermining the core commitment of rational choice theory to
the transitivity of preferences. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE
SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 227-44 (1992).
'a For an immodest effort in this direction, see Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and
Classical Realism, in THE LEGACY OF OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Steven J. Burton
ed., forthcoming 1998).
'9 Posner, supra note 2, at 1186.
2Posner cites, among others, Elizabeth Anderson, Ruth Chang, and Joseph Raz.
See id. at 1185 n.1.
21 Posner even concludes his piece with the concession that it "has not refuted the
arguments advanced by philosophers who believe in the incommensurability of values.
Instead, it has shown that the evidence on which they base their arguments... is
susceptible to another interpretation." Id. at 1213. But Posner misconstrues the
evidence, and his alternative interpretation is a nonstarter, as I discuss in the text.
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The reason that people treat supposedly incommensurable options
as though they were commensurable is that resources are scarce and
choices must be made.... Lawyers, businessmen, movie moguls, politi-
cians, and even ordinary people constrained by time and resources drop
friends when the costs of maintaining the friendship become too high.
People routinely risk or violate family relationships by accepting attrac-
tive job offers in distant locations. Individuals make implicit valuations
of the environment when they choose detergents, buy paper products,
recycle newspapers but not bottles, purchase large houses rather than
small apartments, and litter. People pay for sex or for companionship,
sometimes overtly and other times in carefully disguised manners, such
as in the form of gifts. Artists and teachers become investment bankers
when their pay falls below a certain level. Workers accept premia for
risks, and agencies use these risk premia in order to calculate the costs
and benefits of regulations.2
But if "resources are scarce and choices must be made," then that
fact, by itself, defeats the behavioral evidence that we conceive values
as commensurable. The explanation for the behavior is not that
values are really commensurable, but that circumstances compel
choices at odds with our concept of value. The point is not a deep
one. If Sophie, with the Nazi soldiers at hand, must choose which of
her children will live or die,3 this hardly shows that she thinks the
value of their lives can be ranked along some metric. So, too, the
behavior of the agents and victims of capitalism is better explained by
the dehumanizing circumstances in which they find themselves rather
than by their tacit embrace of a philosophical thesis, that is, that
values really are commensurable.
Clearing up this confusion actually vitiates, as far as I can see, the
motivation for the rest of Posner's argument: "People rationally make
incommensurability claims in order to obtain strategic advantages in
their interactions with others."24 Posner may have identified correctly
why some people claim that values are incommensurable, but this is
irrelevant to the question of whether or not values are incommensu-
rable-just as the fact that politicians routinely invoke moral consid-
erations on behalf of the policies they advocate is irrelevant to the
question of whether or not these policies are moral. Politicians have
motivations, to be sure, for claiming "morality" for their cause, but this
observation is inapposite when asking, "Is their cause moral?"
22Id. at 1188.
See WILiAAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE 483-84 (1976) (describing Sophie's
choice of her son over her daughter).
24 Posner, supra note 2, at 1186.
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The explanatory theory Posner offers is largely "speculative" in
character, appealing not to any empirical results of social-scientific
research, but to undocumented claims and assertions, whose main
justification is that they conform "to the standard premises of rational
choice theory."2 This would be interesting, I suppose, if rational
choice theory were empirically valid, but I have already noted my
skepticism on that score. Yet, the sorts of claims the theory leads
Posner to make will hardly reassure those who are uncertain about its
validity. We are told, for example, that "[s]ome sives cheat on their
husbands even though they know that their infidelity might be re-
vealed and, if so, will injure the long-term health of their marriage;
other vives do not cheat on their husbands because they do not want
to risk their marriage." 6 But surely some wives cheat on their hus-
bands because they want to endanger their marriage; and surely
others cheat because they are bored and sexually unsatisfied, and
make only short-term decisions, not long-term calculations; and still
some others cheat because their husbands want them to because the
husbands find it arousing; and still others do not cheat because they
have no sexual desire for anyone else, or because they think it would
be dishonorable to violate the marital oath. All of this psychological
complexity vanishes when our speculative explanations must conform
to the demands of rational choice theory.
Now these kinds of points are certainly quite familiar to propo-
nents and critics of rational choice theory alike. Posner simply falls
back on the standard refrain that the theory "abstracts out one ele-
ment of human motivation in the hope of shedding light on" the
phenomena in question.27 The "light" mentioned must presumably
be predictive light, and here again we find ourselves thrown back to an
empirical question. To most noneconomist observers, the answer
seems fairly clear. As Daniel Hausman, a sympathetic critic of eco-
nomics, puts it, "the justification for a particular paradigm or re-
search program... is success and progress, including especially
empirical success and progress. Since economics has not been very
successful and has not made much empirical progress, economists
should be exploring alternatives. " M Nevertheless, none of this uncer-
tainty about the core animating assumptions surfaces in Posner's
article-though in this regard his article is hardly anomalous for the
2 Id. at 1192.
26 Id.
27sId. at 1200.
28HAUSMAN, supra note 17, at 279-80.
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law-review literature applying economic analysis and rational choice
theory.
The "one element of human motivation"2 on which rational
choice theory settles is, itself, revealing. Take Posner's rational-choice
treatment of "principled" behavior. To be "principled" for this pur-
pose is to be "a person who does not cheat in relationships, a coop-
erator."30 Incommensurability claims, according to Posner, are sup-
posed to be a species of "principled" behavior-a way of signaling to
others that one is not a "bad type [] ."' But all cases of putative alle-
giance to "principle" are purely strategic in character, a way of gain-
ing certain advantages, of broadcasting a "reputation" that it is useful
to have.
Now "principled" individuals, to be sure, are not likely to be
found in great numbers in Congress, or in the national media, or on
the faculties of elite universities, or in the upper echelons of leading
corporations. And since these core institutions of capitalist society
play the dominant role in shaping attitudes, values, and conduct in
the society at large, it is perhaps not surprising to find academic
apologists for capitalism asserting that "a person who claims to be
principled is not being honest. " 2 Of course, from within the institu-
tions whose agents have internalized market norms, this is surely
correct. The mistake, obviously, is to treat the theory of agency that is
adequate to a particular socioeconomic form of organization as adequate to
human beings as such. Nelson Mandela was principled when he
refused to compromise with his captors, even though it meant spend-
ing a third of his life in prison. Martin Luther King, Jr., was princi-
pled when his commitment to justice led him to increasingly vocal
attacks on capitalism and the imperialist aggression in Vietnam, even
though this discomfited the mainstream civil-rights establishment
with its more modest agenda. The first whites to act against self-
interest and campaign against apartheid in both South Africa and the
United States were communists acting on principle. The legions of
young people who left their jobs and college studies to fight, futilely,
against fascism in Spain in the 1930s acted on principle. The history
of the world is simply replete with examples of principled behavior, of
Posner, supra note 2, at 1200.
0 Id.
s1 Id.
32 Id. at 1198.
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behavior that sometimes cost principled actors everything, including
their lives.
So Posner's argument actually suggests, to my mind, a very differ-
ent question: What pathology of socioeconomic circumstances has
led to an academic discourse in which statements like "a person who
claims to be principled is not being honest"33 are propounded and
accepted uncritically? I do not doubt, for one moment, that there is
any shortage of self-interested behavior in the world, and that this fact
is central to any serious understanding of human affairs for the fore-
seeable future.34 What I wonder about is how this latter observation,
common to everyone from Thucydides to Marx, could become
transmogrified into claims like "a rational person will sacrifice his
reputation when the gains are sufficiently high., 35 Let us assume that
"rational" is a purely descriptive term, for otherwise the claim is merely
tautological (a "rational" person-that is, one who knows that one
ought to sacrifice anything for sufficiently high gains-will sacrifice his
reputation when the gains are sufficiently high). And let us assume,
too, that "sufficiently high" gains are not measured along some met-
ric commensurate with reputation, lest the claim also be vacuous.
Given those assumptions, however, the claim is sheer nonsense. Yet
it, and claims like it, defines a whole genre of legal and economic
scholarship, a genre apparently impervious to reality and indifferent
to empirical research. "People stigmatize others who too overtly
desire money in order to represent, by comparison, their own immu-
nity from being bought off or tempted to defect by a higher payoff."36
But perhaps people stigmatize the overt pursuit of money because it is
invariably associated with a coarsening of character and sensibility, a
squandering of talent, an evisceration of the capacity for love, friend-
ship, creativity, and other human goods? Posner's article is a veritable
parade of these quite wild, speculative generalizations, of which the
claims about incommensurability are but a small (and hardly the most
implausible) subset. Why these claims would attract some of the
brightest minds in the legal academy, and why they would find a
forum in the most distinguished journals, is an even more compelling
question, in my view, than the consequences of abandoning the truth-
norm when debating incommensurability.
33 Id.
34 See Leiter, supra note 18.
Posner, supra note 2, at 1198.
" Id. at 1206.
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